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Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) solutions are a critical information 
systems security control for monitoring, assessing, and reacting to cyber threats in near 
real-time. A given SIEM solution, however, is not a simple plug-and-play, drop-in, 
security device. On the contrary, a successful implementation requires configuration 
tailored to the specifics of a target network, as well as operators who are very 
knowledgeable of both the SIEM’s functionality and the characteristics of network/data-
center events.  
This thesis will lay the framework for SIEM operator education via use of pre-
captured network/data-center events (i.e., network traffic and device log information). 
The desired outcome is a repeatable framework that can be utilized by organizations 
interested in deploying more technically savvy SIEM operators. The framework will be 
empirically demonstrated with a SIEM learning lab developed for HP’s ArcSight SIEM.  
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A. THESIS STATEMENT 
The purpose of this thesis is to develop a repeatable Security Information & Event 
Management (SIEM) educational framework that can be used to train and educate SIEM 
operators effectively. The framework will be empirically demonstrated with a scenario-
based training lab that analyzes pre-captured replay events (e.g., network traffic and 
device log information) using HP ArcSight Enterprise Security Management (ESM) [1].1 
Through the lab sessions, operators will explore and understand the various functional 
components and operational processes of ArcSight, and work to develop a more optimal 
SIEM configuration solution for the target scenario represented by its pre-captured replay 
events. 
To achieve the primary thesis objective, the research needs to answer the 
following questions: 
1. What are the important learning elements that must be encapsulated within 
the SIEM educational framework so as to provide a cyber-forensic 
methodology for a SIEM operator?  
2. What information within the pre-captured replay events is required for 
informative forensic analysis? 
3. How does the correlation engine within ArcSight ESM perform to identify 
the threat relationships between events? 
4. What is a more optimal SIEM configuration (e.g., rule filters and asset 
characterizations) that will result in the highest likelihood of threat 
detection? 
5. How can the SIEM solution be generalized into an instructional 
methodology that can be demonstrated in a SIEM learning lab? 
 
 
                                                 
1. ArcSight ESM is a comprehensive SIEM software solution that combines traditional security event 
monitoring with network intelligence, context correlation, anomaly detection, historical analysis tools and 
automated remediation. 
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B. THESIS SCOPE AND ORGANIZATION 
This thesis will focus on three main areas: 
1. Review Research on Currently Deployed SIEM solutions 
The first phase will explain the role that SIEM solutions play in the 
overall, defense-in-depth, security posture of a well-defended data center. 
A short overview of worldwide deployment will provide some motivation 
regarding the growing adoption of these types of security controls for 
providing cyber situational awareness in data centers. In particular, we 
examine the significance of SIEM solutions in environments where the 
volume of events exceeds the ability of personnel to monitor or analyze 
these events manually.  
2. Analysis of the Functional Components within ArcSight 
The next phase will focus on studying the entire security event life cycle 
that starts with event collection and continues through event correlation 
and storage. This will involve the analysis of the functionality of the core 
components and workflow structure within ArcSight to understand its 
operational processes and how they combine to bring a valued-added 
solution to detection analysis in a security operations center (SOC). 
3. Development of Training Scenarios Based on Pre-captured Replay 
Events 
Pre-captured replay events are essentially a set of logged records of 
historic cyber activities which (by design) represent both normal (i.e., 
benign) and malicious actions. In this phase, a cyber-forensic 
methodology will be designed and incorporated within the training lab to 
edify SIEM operators regarding how configuration changes to a SIEM’s 
various settings result in a higher signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) regarding the 
identification of malicious events among the background noise of 
“normal” events.  
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This thesis consists of six chapters: 
 The thesis objective and the procedural approach used in achieving the 
objective are described in Chapter I. 
 The purpose of this thesis as it presents the impact of cyber-attacks, as 
well as the complexities and challenges in implementing a SIEM solution 
are highlighted in Chapter II.  Also included in this chapter is an 
explanation of the need to derive an effective training methodology for 
SIEM operators. The fundamental principles of SIEM operation and its 
evolution are also examined. 
 The system anatomy of ArcSight is described in Chapter III along with an 
overview of the functionalities of its core components. This will allow 
readers to understand the operational processes within ArcSight which 
serve to automate the detection, and optionally the reaction, to malicious 
actions taken against a data center.  
 The strategy for deriving the SIEM training methodology and educational 
framework is discussed in Chapter IV. The tools, learning goals and 
method used in developing a scenario are also presented. 
 The learning scenario is described in Chapter V by analyzing the replay 
events and subsequently deriving a more optimal SIEM solution. It 
includes a scenario brief to SIEM operators and expected results. 
 A summary of the research is included in Chapter VI along with  
recommendations for future work 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. IMPACT OF CYBER-ATTACKS 
In a network-centric modern society, the increasing operational “footprint” of 
computer-based systems, along with the rewards for subverting/exploiting the 
information they process, store, or transport, leads to a rising occurrence of cyber-attacks. 
Communication across vast distances is now quicker and easier with the advancement in 
mobile computing devices and more ubiquitous connectivity and bandwidth. As a result, 
more people and business organizations are connected virtually, which in turn increases 
the amount of sensitive and private information flowing in the virtual space. Based on 
statistical results from the Internet World Stats [1], a 566.4% growth in the number of 
Internet users around the world from 2000 to 2012 has been recorded. This explosive 
growth clearly indicates the pervasiveness of the Internet. In addition, the ever-growing 
reliance on Internet technology as the primary medium for our daily services (e.g., 
business operations, information sources, etc.), has further extended the damage that can 
be incurred by an individual or organization due to cyber-attacks. In an article compiled 
by Business Roundtable,2 named “Growing Business Dependence on the Internet” [2], 
the economic consequences and adverse impact on the companies was highlighted, as 
they depend more on the Internet to help them conduct worldwide business operations. 
Within the article, the following is quoted: 
According to the World Economic Forum, a breakdown of the Critical 
Information Infrastructure (CII) is one of the core risks facing the 
international economy. The World Economic Forum estimates that there is 
a 10 to 20 percent probability of a CII breakdown in the next 10 years 
(Figure 1. ), one of the highest likelihood estimates of the 23 global risks it 
examined in a recent report. The report estimates the global economic cost 
of the incident at approximately $250 billion, or more costly than two-
thirds of the [all others included in the report] risks. [2] 
                                                 
2. Business Roundtable (BRT) is an association of chief executive officers of leading U.S. companies 
with more than $7.3 trillion in annual revenues and nearly 16 million employees 
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Figure 1.  23 Core global risks: Likelihood with severity by economic loss. From [2]. 
Based on the World Economic Forum’s estimate, it can be seen that the global 
economy relies heavily on CII, which is essentially the Internet. While natural disasters 
are also mentioned as a potential threat to the Internet, the article gave greater emphasis 
to cyber-attacks and highlighted them as the main threat behind various crisis scenarios. 
This emphasis is understandable given the increasing amount of cyber-attacks faced by 
many business organizations on a daily basis. 
In the military domain, cyber-attacks have been treated with a more serious tone, 
being labeled as “cyber-warfare” or “cyber-terrorism.” Both terms explicitly describe the 
severe impact on the national security such attacks would have if they were to succeed. 
Many military intelligence agencies around the world have compared conventional 
warfare with cyber-warfare, revealing that the latter can inflict worse damage with much 
less effort. This is due in part to the increase in online (i.e., remote via the CII) control of 
critical national infrastructures such as power stations, transportation systems and oil 
refineries. Crippling such key installations can generate cascading effects that will not 
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only disrupt daily activities, but also create mass damage that may result in catastrophic 
loss of life and destruction of property. 
B. COUNTERING CYBER-ATTACKS WITH SIEM 
Over the past decade, the aforementioned threats have forced cyber defenders to 
continuously invent protection mechanisms to mitigate cyber-attacks. A SIEM product is 
one such mitigation solution. Simply stated, a SIEM product is an information system 
security control employed for monitoring, assessing and reacting to cyber-attacks in real-
time, or at least much more quickly than if any of the entailed processes were done 
manually. 
 
Figure 2.  Modern evolution of SIEM. From [3]. 
The current state of SIEM products has evolved from two formerly disparate 
product categories: SIM (Security Information Management) and SEM (Security Event 
Management) (Figure 2. ). While SIM products were used primarily to gather and create 
reports from security logs, SEM products utilized event correlation and alerting functions 
to help with analysis and incident response. On the surface, both product classes 
possessed fundamental differences in their capabilities to manage a torrent of system 
events and enforce the desired security observations. However, in-depth analysis reveals 
various commonalities between these product classes, such as their workflow and 
reporting processes. Each product class provided security features that can be 
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complemented by the other to provide a more holistic approach in countering cyber-
attacks. As such, their functions were combined and integrated into a single security 
management system, known as a SIEM. 
Most SIEM products work by deploying multiple collection agents and 
connecting them with end-users’ devices, such as servers and firewalls, so as to gather 
many diverse security-related events. The collectors then normalize the events to a 
standard format before forwarding them to a centralized management console, which 
performs inspection and flags identified anomalies. By anomalies here, we mean any 
events that solely or in toto represent either a realized or pending threat to the protected 
system (network, data-center, etc.). The process of identifying anomalies is usually 
handled by either a rule-based or statistical correlation engine which establishes 
relationships between the event logs, infers the significance of those relationships and 
prioritizes them. Once flagged, the events will be monitored and inspected further to 
determine any potential or realized damage. Optionally, automated actions can be tied to 
such malicious event detections, thus providing not only detection capabilities but 
reaction capabilities as well.  
C. COMPLEXITIES AND CHALLENGES IN IMPLEMENTING SIEM 
The underlying principle of a SIEM product is that relevant system data about an 
organization’s security is generated in multiple locations and collated into a single point 
of view, which makes it easier to spot the trends and patterns of a cyber-attack. This is 
supposed to make analysis and response easier for the security professionals. However, a 
SIEM product is not a simple plug-and-play, drop-in, security device. Based on a recent 
survey conducted by elQnetworks, a pioneer in simplified security, risk and compliance 
solutions; it was revealed that organizations are having difficulties with SIEM 
deployments [4].  
The first challenge identified was the long deployment time required. The survey 
quoted 44% of the respondents reporting that it took a few weeks to more than a month to 
deploy their latest SIEM product. This reflects that the products require fine-tuning over 
time to get real security value (ROI) and can take months to obtain useful data.  
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The second challenge was attributed to the lack of trained personnel. It was found 
that the complexities involved in correlating security and configuration data across IT 
assets and deriving an adequate set of security controls could prove to be too technically 
complex for the typical IT operator. A successful implementation requires configuration 
tailored to the specifics of the target network, as well as operators who possess deep 
knowledge on both the SIEM’s functionality and the characteristics of network events. 
This is a very broad domain of knowledge encompassing; among other things, operating 
systems, applications, log formatting, flows, authentication, protocol, and TCP/IP stack 
understanding.  
The last challenge was associated with compliance issues. 35% of the respondents 
stated that compliance requirements were the primary driver behind the use of SIEM. 
Rather than focusing on the security deliverables offered by the SIEM product, some 
organizations are employing them only to satisfy compliance and regulatory requirements 
(e.g., PCI, HIPAA, and GLBA). As such, many SIEM products were reduced in 
functionality to being mere electronic organizers. 
From the challenges and complexities stated, it is clear that the capabilities of 
many SIEM deployments have been marginalized and their full potential in providing a 
more secure cyber environment has yet to be realized. These are risk factors for 
organizations which have invested large amounts of money in SIEM products, only to 
receive sub-optimal protection returns on this investment. When configured, deployed, or 
operated incorrectly, SIEM products may even be counter-productive by introducing 
added complexity, confusion, and service disruption.  
D. FRAMEWORK FOR SIEM OPERATOR EDUCATION 
In truth, SIEM products remain a state-of-the-art technology that requires 
specialized and trained personnel to set up, configure and manage them. When an 
untrained IT operator is first tasked to utilize a SIEM product, he/she will likely be 
overwhelmed by the multitude of configurations, user-interfaces and processes he/she 
must understand prior to successful operation of the product. With lack of a systematic 
approach and detailed understanding of the workflow processes used by the core 
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functionalities in a SIEM product, the IT operator will be set back for many weeks in 
his/her effort to implement the desired protection. To ensure that IT operators possess 
adequate knowledge and attain the required operational capability within a short time 
frame, it is important to derive an educational framework that can be used in a repeatable 
manner. This will provide the training foundation needed to increase the technical level 
of all operators in utilizing the SIEM product effectively to mitigate cyber-attacks. 
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III. ARCSIGHT ESM ANATOMY 
In this chapter, the important learning elements required in implementing the 
ArcSight ESM are explained. Also highlighted are the various   functional processes 
within a typical SIEM product. 
Prior to utilizing ArcSight ESM, it is crucial to first identify and understand the 
functionalities of the various software/hardware components within the SIEM framework 
(Figure 3). These are the tools that are responsible for providing the cyber-forensic 
capabilities that will be used by SIEM operators to collect, analyze and detect the 
malicious events. They range from source devices (e.g., servers) that instantiate the 
events to ArcSight core components. The workflow structure throughout the ESM will 
then be explained to further enhance the reader’s understanding of the operational 
processes required throughout the event life cycle. 
 
Figure 3.  ArcSight ESM’s connectivity diagram. After [5]. 
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A. COMPONENT FUNCTIONALITIES 
1. Network Devices and Applications 
A network device is the source of events. It is a network node that has a physical 
processing location with a unique network address (e.g., IP address, MAC address) and 
possesses the capability to recognize, process and transmit to other nodes. The events 
output from the network device will be fed into the ArcSight SmartConnectors to 
generate correlation-relevant data on the network. The various types of network devices 
that are supported by ArcSight ESM are shown in Figure 4.  
 




2. ArcSight SmartConnectors 
SmartConnectors provide the interface between the network devices and the 
ArcSight Express. As different devices have varying logging formats and reporting 
mechanisms, it is difficult to extract information for querying without first normalizing 
the events. Henceforth, SmartConnectors are responsible for translating a multitude of 
device outputs into a normalized schema that becomes the starting point for the 
correlation process done by the ArcSight Express. After collecting the event data from 
the network devices, the SmartConnectors will normalize the data values and structures 
to a common schema. This will then allow SmartConnectors to filter events and reduce 
the volume of events sent to the ArcSight Express, which in turn increases its efficiency 
and accuracy while reducing event processing time.  
3. ArcSight Express 
ArcSight Express is the heart of the ESM framework. Commonly known as the 
Manager, it is a licensed hardware appliance that drives analysis, workflow and other 
security services. It writes events to the Correlation Optimized Retention and Retrieval 
Engine (CORR-Engine) as they stream into the system and simultaneously processes 
them through the correlation engine, which evaluates each event with network model and 
vulnerability information to develop real-time threat summaries. ArcSight Express is 
installed with a Management Console to provide the administrator interface for managing 
user accounts and events storage. 
a. CORR-Engine Storage 
The CORR-Engine is a proprietary data storage and retrieval framework 
that receives and processes events at high rates and performs high-speed searches. Unlike 
traditional Relational Database Management System (RDBMS)-based storage that 
inhibits high-speed correlation [6], the CORR-Engine is able to access the vast amount of 
stored events at a greater speed, therefore allowing the correlation engine to process 
logged events at much higher rates for threat detection and security analysis. 
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b. Management Console 
The Management Console is essentially an embedded web application that 
resides within the ArcSight Express to provide a streamlined interface for managing user 
accounts, monitoring events, configuring storage, updating licenses and managing 
component authentication (e.g., SmartConnectors’ connection). 
4. ArcSight Console 
Unlike the Management Console that is used primarily for registration of users 
and connecting components, the ArcSight Console (Figure 5) is the main authoring tool 
for building filters, rules and security reports. It is a separate workstation that hosts an 
application interface intended for use by SIEM operators to build complex correlation 
rules within the correlation engine, as well as to perform routine administrative functions. 
In addition, the console also provides various graphical means (e.g., dashboards and line 
graphs) to present correlated events. Better visual representations of network status 
improve the situational awareness of the SIEM operator. 
 
Figure 5.  ArcSight Console Interface. After [5]. 
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B. WORKFLOW STRUCTURE 
A well-defined workflow structure allows SIEM operators to understand the 
procedural approach in implementing ArcSight ESM. In addition, it also provides insight 
on the operational processes that will occur at each step. ArcSight ESM processes events 
in phases to identify and, optionally, act upon events of interest. An overview of the 
major steps in this event workflow is shown in Figure 6.  
 
Figure 6.  Life Cycle of ArcSight ESM. After [5]. 
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1. Phase 1 – Key Assets Identification 
Identifying key assets within a network is the first major step required in the 
SIEM life cycle, as it will determine and directly influence the threat evaluation process 
associated with them. When an operator is required to set up the ArcSight ESM, he/she 
must clearly understand the network topology and distinguish the importance of the 
various subnets, network devices and end-points (e.g., workstations and servers). Those 
that are classified as sensitive shall then be identified as key assets and thus given greater 
emphasis during the processes of Asset and Network Modeling. Both processes are 
essential functional steps for ArcSight ESM to become “familiar” with the network 
environment that it is protecting and perform more informed, meaningful, event threat 
evaluation in a later phase. 
a. Asset Modeling 
Modeling assets is a multi-step process that requires a SIEM operator to 
consider what types of information to track from various assets in the network and how 
those assets interrelate. The distinctions drawn in this process become factors for the 
filters, rules, data monitors and reports that will be used to correlate events generated. 
In network architecture, an asset is any endpoint that is considered 
significant enough to be characterized with details that will make correlation and 
reporting more meaningful. The significance can be determined by the criticality of the 
information that is stored in the asset. They include servers and laptops. The following 
information is required to establish a unique identity of the asset that will be recognized 
by the ESM: 
 Asset name (a name used to refer to the asset within ESM) 
 Network IP address 
 MAC address 
 Full qualified domain name 
Knowing the identity of an asset is not enough for ESM to perform 
evaluation on the events generated. To evaluate the threats or behaviors associated with 
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the asset, it is crucial to include more information pertaining to each asset’s configuration 
(Figure 7), particularly the following: 
 Vulnerabilities – A vulnerability description is used to define the 
potential exploitation that exists in any hardware, firmware or 
software state. If an asset meets all of the requirements described 
in the vulnerability description, an event will be generated by ESM 
for subsequent evaluation. 
 Open ports 
 Operating system 
 Key applications installed 
 Roles of the asset within the enterprise 
 
Figure 7.  Asset attributes example. After [5]. 
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b. Network Modeling 
Network modeling is done to keep track of the asset traffic on the network 
that is being monitored. In this process, the physical network architecture is mapped and 
segregated into various functional zones. Every network device in the network is 
considered a separate asset. Examples of network-visible interfaces include routers, web 
servers or anything with an IP or MAC address. 
A zone represents part of the network and is identified by a contiguous 
block of IP addresses. It usually represents a functional group within the network or a 
subnet, such as a wireless LAN, VPN or DMZ. Zones are also how ESM resolves private 
networks whose IP ranges may overlap with other existing IP ranges. SmartConnectors 
tag incoming events with zones. When the SmartConnector processes an event, it 
evaluates each of the IP addresses involved in the event and tries to locate the zone 
associated with that IP address among an ordered list of networks. Through this process, 
SIEM operators are be able to differentiate the events collected from the various assets in 
different zones. 
2. Phase 2 – Data Collection, Normalization and Aggregation 
The SmartConnector is the interface through which events arrive in ESM from 
devices. It performs the first layer of event tagging by applying normalization, filtering 
and event aggregation to reduce the volume of the event stream to make event processing 
faster and more efficient (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8.  Data Collection, Normalization and Aggregation Process. After [5]. 
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a. Data Collection 
Once the key assets have been identified, the next process is to gather 
information from these assets. The data collected are essentially log data, where each log 
entry is translated into one event as interpreted by the SmartConnector. 
b. Normalization 
Normalization is the process of taking events from disparate devices that 
are presented in multiple formats and recasting them into a common schema (syntax and 
semantics). Because networks are heterogeneous environments, different devices will 
likely have dissimilar, vendor-specific, logging formats. This lack of standardization 
hinders event correlation, which requires that “apples be compared to apples.” As such, 
the SmartConnector is responsible for normalizing the events gathered, into a conforming 
event schema. This is achieved through a parser which populates the native form values 
from the original event generator into the corresponding field in the normalized schema 
and reformats as may be necessary (e.g., MMDDYY date format may be recast into DD-
Month-YYYY format). Once normalized, the raw (native form) event is now referred to as 
a base event.3 A database, specifically the CORR-database, populated with these 
standardized base events allows for consistent reporting and forensic analysis to be 
performed on every event regardless of its original data source or format.  
Other than inheriting the original values from the source device, the 
normalization process also converts certain values for the following event field: 
 Event Severity – Some of the reporting devices to the 
SmartConnector offer initial threat evaluation that describes their 
interpretation of the danger posed by a particular event. For 
example, if a network IDS detects port scanning by a workstation 
with an external IP, the network IDS will flag this event as a high-
priority exploit. To ArcSight ESM, this is known as device 
severity. Similar to the varying logging format, the scale of device 
severity also differs between security devices. For example, 
network Intrusion Detection System (IDS) A may use a security 
rating of 1–10 while network IDS B uses a scale of high, medium 
and low. In this case, the inherited device severity readings will be 
                                                 
3. ArcSight refers to an event that has been processed by an ArcSight SmartConnector as a base event. 
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normalized by the ArcSight ESM into a single agent severity scale, 
called agent severity. Both device severity and agent severity are 
important data points that will be used to calculate the event’s 
overall security priority. 
 
 Timestamps – Another factor in normalization is to convert the 
varying timestamps to a common format. This is important for an 
enterprise network that stretches across continents with different 
time zones. 
c. Aggregation 
The purpose of aggregation is to streamline and group events with similar 
data information, thus reducing the volume of base events sent to the ArcSight ESM. It is 
common to see groups of events arriving at the SmartConnector with the same value in a 
specific set of fields. For example, a network device may submit multiple status log 
entries to the SmartConnector over a short period of time. In this case, the events will 
share the same source IP address and event name. SmartConnector aggregation will then 
merge these events with similar values into a single aggregated event that includes the 
earliest start time and latest end time. This will significantly reduce the computation 
burden on the ArcSight ESM, allowing processing to occur on smaller and more 
manageable data sets. 
3. Phase 3 –Event Threat Level Evaluation 
One of the main security functions of a SIEM product is to accurately identify a 
malicious event that is happening (or has happened) within the network to the SIEM 
operator so that security actions can be taken to counter or otherwise recover from the 
attack. This is only possible after the events have been evaluated to understand their 
potential threat to the network’s overall security. Evaluated events will be categorized 
into different threat levels, where each level is associated with a series of security actions 
that can be invoked to reduce or eliminate the events’ adverse impact. 
In ArcSight ESM, once the base events have been processed to a common data 
set, a priority formula will then be used as the threat level metric to determine an event’s 
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relative importance to the network. This is an important function as it serves as an 
indicator to signal the SIEM operator on whether the evaluated event requires further 
investigation or action. A high priority factor generally means that an event is of high risk 
factor. 
 
Figure 9.  Event Threat Level Evaluation. After [5]. 
The priority formula consists of four factors that combine with agent severity to 
generate an overall priority rating. Each of the criteria described in Table 1 contributes a 
numeric value to the priority formula, which are eventually averaged to provide the 
















Model confidence refers to whether or not the target asset has 
been modeled in ESM and to what degree. For assets that have 
not been modeled in ArcSight ESM, the associated event is 
regarded with lower model confidence, which in turn attributes 
to lower priority rating. 
2 Relevance 
As mentioned in Phase 1, attributing assets with additional 
configuration information allows in-depth threat evaluation to 
be performed. In this factor, relevance refers to the relevancy 
of an event to an asset and it looks at whether the event targets 
port and/or vulnerabilities of a particular modeled asset. If 
relevance is high, it means the target is vulnerable to the stated 
attack and/or the stated port is open. 
3 Severity 
Unlike device or agent severity, this parameter is used as a 
history function for the priority formula. It leverages on an 
ESM resource4  called active list5 to check on previous events 
on whether an associated asset has been listed as a target or 
attacker before. If the asset appears as an attacker in the active 




This factor measures how important the target asset is in the 
context of the network when constructed during asset 
modeling. If an event reports on an asset which is categorized 
as higher criticality due to its access to confidential 
information, then this factor will reflect high priority rating. 
Table 1.   Factors contributing to Priority Formula. From [5]. 
The calculated priority is categorized into five different levels, namely very low, 
low, medium, high and very high. While the lowest level usually means a routine event 
that does not consist of threats, a high priority event may not necessarily mean a threat 
either. For example, if a critical asset fails due to internal hardware failure, the priority of 
events reporting it may be very high, but it does not represent a malicious attack. 
Therefore, it is always important for a SIEM operator to conduct further investigation 
                                                 
4. ESM manages the logic used to process evens as objects called resources. A resource defines the 
properties, values and relationships to configure the functions ESM performs [5]. 
5. Active Lists are used as like a bulletin board to specify fields of event data for correlation or 
monitoring purposes. 
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(e.g., a physical check on the reporting device) on events with high priority ratings so as 
to confirm the existence and characteristics of the threats. Once confirmed, a pre-
determined series of security actions can then be carried out to mitigate the threats. 
4. Phase 4 – Events Correlation 
Events generated from multiple endpoints may contain a mixture of normal and 
malicious event information. While analyzing a single event in isolation is rarely enough 
to confirm its significance, the difficulty of event cross-referencing—correlation—
increases with the volume of events. As such, automated event correlation becomes one 
of the most important value-added functions of a SIEM product. Event correlation is a 
process that discovers associations among different but related events, in order to provide 
a SIEM operator with a bigger, more accurate, picture than a single event would provide 
in isolation. Correlation links multiple events together to detect malicious behaviors that 
might have otherwise been missed in the background noise associated with a high volume 
of routine, non-malicious events and network traffic. 
In ArcSight ESM, once events have been normalized, prioritized, and their 
endpoints identified within the asset and network model, they are processed by the 
correlation engine, which is where filters, rules and data monitors are used to find the 
events of interest (Figure 10. ). ESM’s correlation tools use statistical analysis, Boolean 
logic and aggregation to find events with particular characteristics as specified by the 
operator. 
 
Figure 10.  Events Correlation Process. After [5]. 
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a. Filters 
Filters are limiting gateways that help to separate events of interest from 
other “noisy events” and reduce the amount of events that are processed by the system. It 
uses a set of conditions that focus on particular event attributes to perform the separation. 
Filters are applied in various stages of the event life cycle. During 
SmartConnector set up, the connector can be configured with filter conditions to focus 
the events passed to the ESM according to specific criteria (Figure 11). This first level of 
filtering prevents those events that do not meet the connector criteria from being 
forwarded to the ESM. Filters applied at the subsequent ESM level will then select which 
events it will process based on the conditions specified (Figure 12). 
 
Figure 11.  SmartConnector Filter Configuration. From [8]. 
 25
 
Figure 12.  ESM Filter Configuration. From [7]. 
The main difference between both levels of filtering lies in their storage of 
rejected events. Only those rejected events from the ESM are stored in the CORR-engine 
storage. It is, therefore, important for the SIEM operator to decide where to apply the 
filter. While applying filters in the first level can significantly improve the signal-to-noise 
ratio, it must be carefully implemented with rigorous checking of the filter conditions. 
This verification ensures that useful events are not inadvertently left out. Rejected events 
that are stored in the ESM provide the SIEM operator with the flexibility to access those 
events later on if there is a change in investigative focus. 
b. Rules 
Rules are the core tool of the ESM correlation engine as they aid in 
revealing the broader meaning out of the steady stream of very narrow meaning 
individual events. A rule is a programmed procedure that evaluates incoming events for 
specific conditions and patterns. It leverages on the capability of filtering to first find 
matching base events and then provides initiate actions in response.  
As events of interest may not stream into the Manager in a consecutive 
manner, the rules engine first looks for matches that fulfill the specified conditions and 
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holds those matches in working memory. With more events streaming in, the stored 
events will be evaluated against the incoming events for aggregation and correlation.  
How long the matching events will be stored in the working memory depends on the rule 
threshold. The threshold is part of the rule that considers how many matching 
occurrences over a specified time frame must occur before the rule’s criteria are 
considered to have been matched. Those partial matches and thresholds not met can be 
discarded from the working memory. 
In ArcSight ESM, rules whose conditions have been met will generate an 
ESM event called a correlation event (Figure 13). Once generated, a correlation event 
will go through the event life cycle again, just as if it were a normalized base event 
reported by a SmartConnector.  
 
Figure 13.  Correlation and Base events on ArcSight Console. After [5]. 
When the correlation event passes through the correlation engine again, it 
is evaluated by other rules that are looking for correlation events with matching 
attributes. For this recursive correlation process to work most effectively, the rules 
leverage the following two ESM resources: 
 Active Lists. These are configurable tables that act like a common 
access bulletin board where specified fields of event data are 
collected and retained during the first round of correlation process. 
The retained event data found in these lists can then be used as 
conditions evaluated by other rules in a subsequent correlation 
evaluation process. Active lists can be used by the operator to 
associate events happening in one area of the network with events 





 Session Lists. Unlike active lists, session lists associate users with 
any events that are known to be associated with them. These lists 
are most typically used for identity correlation, such as to track 
user logins/logouts. For example, when a user logs in to a server, 
his/her user ID is added to the session list with a start time. When 
he/she logs out, an end time is appended to the same entry in the 
session list. This will allow later queries to the session list to check 
on the time interval over which a particular user was logged into a 
particular server. In terms of persistency of lists stored, session 
lists stay in the system longer and will require manual purging if 
removal from the list is desired. By contrast, active lists have a 
Time-To-Live (TTL) parameter that enables them to be 
automatically purged when the TTL expires. 
SIEM operators should be familiar with the usage of both lists so that the 
malicious events within complex and varied scenarios can be tracked by the recursive 
correlation process. 
5. Phase 5 – Monitoring and Investigation 
ESM’s normalization and correlation processes enable SOC personnel to have 
real-time situational awareness as events occur. After these backend processes (i.e., 
collection, normalization, filtering, and rule-evaluation) have completed their tasks, the 
next phase will be to present derived information to the operator. This can be achieved by 
using the various monitoring and investigation resources within ESM (Figure 14). 
 
Figure 14.  Monitoring and Investigation Process. After [5]. 
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a. Active Channels 
Similar to a channel tuned to a certain frequency on a television set, an 
active channel displays a stream of information defined by parameters set in the active 
channel editor. As mentioned previously, filters are used across the event life cycle 
stages. A local filter condition in the active channel helps to filter the stream of 
normalized base events, status events, and correlation events flowing through the ESM 
and to display only those that are of interest to the operators. In addition, an in-line filter 
can be configured within an active channel to further refine the conditions already set by 
the local filter. Unlike the local filter that allows manipulation of different event 
attributes, an in-line filter only works on one event attribute (i.e., schema column) at a 
time and uses the logical AND operator to perform the condition refinement. The in-line 
filter offers a quick and flexible way for the SIEM operator to further examine filtered 
events that works on the base conditions. 
 





The following two types of active channel are used extensively for 
monitoring and investigation: 
 Live Channel – This channel displays real-time events and reflects 
any changes at its next refresh cycle, such as new base events 
arriving from SmartConnectors or when a user annotates an 
existing event with an investigation. 
 Rules Channel – During situations whereby suspicious behavior 
are observed and new rules are required to draw on different fields 
of event data for correlation purposes, this channel allows SIEM 
operators to test newly-created rules on a fixed time window with 
historical events. The advantage of this channel is that rules can be 
tested and adjusted accordingly without conflicting with the 
ongoing rules that are being actively applied to the real-time 
events. Once the rules are proven to work as expected, they can 
then be linked to the Real-Time Rules folder, which holds all the 
rules that act on the real-time events. 
b. Dashboard 
ESM also uses another resource type called a dashboard, which is used to 
present events in various user-chosen formats. Instead of using the typical matrix table as 
shown in the active channels, dashboards are capable of showing events in a variety of 
graphical and tabular formats that summarize selected collections of events. Within a 
single dashboard, there can be multiple data monitors that provide different graphical 
event presentations. For example, if a SIEM operator wants to have a continuous update 
on the overall state of an enterprise’s network security, he/she can create the various data 
monitors as shown in Figure 16.  
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Figure 16.  Security Activity Statistics Dashboard. From [5]. 
Data monitors work essentially the same as rules in that they evaluate the 
event stream and aggregate events with common elements. Rules focus on inferring 
meaning from certain event conditions and combinations to enhance interpretation and, 
optionally, to specify certain actions. Data monitors, on the other hand, focus on 
summarizing event data and presenting them graphically. They cannot be used to trigger 
actions like rules. As such, data monitors provide another type of analysis, such as 
calculating statistics and moving data averages. 
The benefit of having a composite dashboard is that it offers an “all-in-
one-glance” panel that summarizes multi-node enterprise security data. This makes it 
easier to visualize attack patterns among nodes on the network. In certain situations, a 
causal relationship between events can also be discovered. For example, an attacker has 
been attempting to hack into an asset through various means. By selecting those events 
together and investigating them with the ESM graphical tools, a causal relationship 
between the attacker and the asset can be more easily seen (Figure 17).  
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Figure 17.  Causal relationship between attacker and asset. From [5]. 
6. Phase 6 - Reporting 
With all the events processed and stored in the CORR-Engine storage, the next 
logical step is to produce reports that can be archived and/or provided in support of 
accreditation or other established security procedures. In the ESM, a summarized 
collection of information pertaining to any particular incident is known as a report. 
Reports are generated either manually or via a pre-defined rule action. Two ESM 
resources utilized in the report creation process are the Query and Template resources.  
a. Query Resource 
A query is a request action to a data source that reports events to ESM. 
Based on the query statement, certain parameters of the data can then be gathered. Some 
of the data sources are CORR-Engine storage and data stored in active lists or session 
lists. 
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b. Template Resource 
Templates are another form of resource that defines the structure in which 
data results from the report are presented. The layout specification can be tailored by the 
SIEM operator to suit an enterprise’s desired reporting format and can enforce the 
necessary standardization. 
 
Figure 18.  Customer Template Design. From [5]. 
The procedural approach in implementing ArcSight ESM has been 
explained in this chapter, with specific emphasis on how the SIEM operator can 
effectively utilize the various tools and resources to conduct the forensic activities. 
Certain resources of ArcSight ESM are deliberately left out of the explanation as they 
either: a) require additional licensing modules (e.g., Pattern discovery & Interactive 
discovery) which are not available in the standard package or b) will not be utilized in the 
training scenarios. Despite this, the chapter has covered the core functional processes that 
are essential to the operation of a typical SIEM product, and this should facilitate the 
basic understanding required to follow the material presented in subsequent chapters. 
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IV. TRAINING STRATEGY 
As part of the thesis objectives, a repeatable educational framework has to be 
created in order to facilitate the SIEM training. This chapter outlines the training strategy 
that will be used to achieve the aforementioned objective. It will include the tools, 
learning goals and method used to develop the scenario-based training lab for SIEM 
operators. 
A. REPLAY TOOLS 
Traffic replay is one of the key features of a SIEM product. The ability to replay 
pre-captured events is particularly useful for the following purposes: 
 Testing – This allows stress testing to be conducted for the ArcSight 
configuration and deployment, while identifying possible loopholes and 
vulnerabilities. 
 Training – For ease of demonstration and training for new cadres of SIEM 
operators. 
In ArcSight, the replay events and connectors are the replay tools. Similar to the 
SmartConnectors, the replay connectors are used primarily to feed the ArcSight Express 
with base events. However, there is a difference in the timestamp of the events provided. 
The SmartConnectors lie in between the network devices and ArcSight Express. 
Real-time raw events generated from the network devices stream through the 
SmartConnectors and undergo filtering, aggregation, normalization and categorization 
prior to arriving at the ArcSight Express. In contrast, the replay connectors are standalone 
modules that are not associated with any network devices (Figure 19). Rather than “live” 
streaming, the replay connectors provide the replay of pre-captured (historical) events 
saved from past activities. 
Despite the difference in the timestamp, ArcSight Express handles every base 
event received in the same manner. When the events arrive, ArcSight Express  subjects 
the events to the real-time rules for filtering and correlation purposes. 
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Figure 19.  ArcSight replay connectors’ connectivity. After [5]. 
B. LEARNING GOALS 
The learning goals are stated to guide the construction of the method, content and 
structure for the learning lab. The learning goals include the steps to create the lab 
environment and the important concepts and skills that will be taught to the SIEM 
operators. 
1. Understand the Behavior of a Cyber Threat 
Without a clear understanding on the behavior of the cyber threat, SIEM operators 
will experience great difficulties in conducting cyber forensic analysis. Therefore, it is 
important to study the behavior of the cyber threat as it will build the knowledge 
foundation in searching for malicious indicators among the myriad events interspersed 
within the seemingly normal cyber activities. An understanding of the interrelation 
between a given cyber threat and its associative event-based indicators will also allow 
SIEM operators to utilize the ArcSight resources for various core processes more 
effectively. 
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In the realm of computer networks, many cyber threats exist. Considering the 
non-distinctive behaviors that can be exhibited by the various threats, it is practically 
impossible to create a single use case or rule that will reliably detect all threats. As such, 
the learning lab will only focus on a particular cyber threat. In this way, the complexities 
involved in rules configuration will be significantly reduced, and hence allow the SIEM 
operators to concentrate on learning the concepts and skills required for cyber forensic 
analysis.  
2. Set up Lab Environment 
Before a SIEM operator can embark on the learning process, the lab environment 
must be set up correctly. The environment will require a collection of replay events that 
can demonstrate the behavior of a particular cyber threat. Then the replay connector will 
be leveraged as the events generator to provide a steady stream of events to the ArcSight 
Express.  
3. Construct Network Topology through “Reverse-Engineering” Method 
The main purpose of the “reverse-engineering” method is to allow the 
construction of the network topology using the information within the base events. 
During the research phase of this thesis, it was realized that the replay events obtained 
were not accompanied by notes regarding the topology of the network from which the 
replay events were collected. As previously mentioned, the network topology aids in 
network and asset modeling and is a crucial step required in the workflow process to 
properly characterize and prioritize information gleaned from the raw events provided by 
the reporting devices. While this situation of an “unfamiliar” network is unlikely in a 
real-world operational environment, it is necessary to deal with this in the context of this 
thesis: owing to the goal of being able to utilize replay events that have been collected 
from various networks, yet process them as though they were from one’s own—
familiar—operational network.  
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4. Associate Threat Behavior 
All the ArcSight core processes depend on the parameters of the event schema to 
perform their functions. For example, during the aggregation process, the rules may use 
the “Source IP address” parameter to combine the network traffic, while in the correlation 
process the “Agent Hostname” parameter can be used to recognize this common 
association between events. With an understanding of a given cyber threat’s behavior, 
SIEM operators will be better able to correlate collected events to indications of that 
threat. 
5. Configure Rules 
Rule writing is an important skill for SIEM operators since a SIEM product is a 
passive system. As such, it requires rules to provide the logical relationships that are 
deemed likely indicators of threats or exploited system behavior. Identified threat 
characteristics are the conditional parameters for the structuring of rules. With an 
understanding of these characteristics, SIEM operators can intelligently modify, or even 
create, rules. 
6. Present and Report Detected Threats 
ArcSight offers various graphical resources to represent network activities and 
detected threats. Many are of these graphical resources are rather intuitive, permitting the 
SIEM operator to quickly understand the current situation. The lab will introduce some of 
the primary graphical resources that can be used to represent the network activity of 
interest and detected threats. Subsequently, the ArcSight report resource will be utilized 
to create a summary of detected threat indications that can be saved and/or printed out for 
archiving purposes. 
C. METHOD 
Scenario-based training will be adopted as the methodology in the learning lab to 
educate the SIEM operators. The scenario will closely mimic a “real-world” situation so 
that the learning experience is practical and can be applicable to other similar situations.  
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1. Scenario Overview 
A computer worm is a form of cyber threat that is encountered by many 
networked systems. A worm is malware that does not rely on human intervention to 
execute and is capable of replicating itself and spreading within and across computer 
networks. A worm targets certain security vulnerabilities and often causes harm to the 
network, such as consuming bandwidth capacity, thus making services unavailable to 
legitimate users and applications.  
As a simple demonstration, the model scenario used in this thesis is based on a 
computer worm that does not carry malicious payload. Recall that a SIEM product is 
used to analyze events reported by network devices rather than (itself) analyzing the 
semantics of the “raw” stimuli that elicited the various events from the monitored 
network devices. The replay events for this model scenario will consist of thousands of 
entries that will simulate a worm outbreak situation where the worm spreads within and 
across multiple networks. This behavior of the typical computer worm will serve as the 
model threat for inexperienced SIEM operators to conduct analysis. 
The “storyboard” of the scenario will revolve around a fictional organization that 
is hosting an online Web portal called “SporeFusion.com.” According to our exercise 
story, in recent months this fictional organization has been facing an increasing number 
of cyber-attacks and has suffered financial loss during some of the more pernicious 
attacks. Seeing the need to protect their business, the organization has decided to 
purchase ArcSight ESM as a detective security control against these threats. The IT 
employees within the organization are tasked with the mission of utilizing ArcSight ESM 
to detect, report, and recover from threats as quickly as possible.  
2. Training Phases 
The learning goals stated will form the structure of the lab, with each goal 
translated to a phase. In most of the phases, the SIEM operators are required to interact 
with the ArcSight ESM. The different phases are intended for progressive learning in 
which the operators will obtain the necessary knowledge and skillset from the earlier 
phases, which are necessary to complete tasks required in later phases. 
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The first phase will require the SIEM operators to study the behavior of computer 
worms and, in particular, understand their “self-replicating” and “spreading” traits. The 
second phase will then focus on the installation of the replay connector on the host 
machine and configuration of the replay events to generate the event flow to ArcSight 
Express. The third phase will demonstrate a way to infer the network topology of the 
capture environment using ArcSight graphical resources. The fourth phase will expose 
SIEM operators to many of the most prominent worm attack indicators that can be used 
to associate to the parameters of the event schema. The fifth and sixth phases are the 
highlights of the learning lab; where the SIEM operators will step through the workflow 
process, construct a set of logical worm detection rules (the fifth phase), and ultimately 
present their worm-detection analysis as an incident report (the sixth phase). These last 
two phases will require more time than the previous four phases due to the trial-and-error 
nature of getting the best rules to elicit the desired response (a high confidence detection 
alert) from the base events involved.  
D. SUMMARY 
This chapter has presented the general approach for the design of a worm 
outbreak scenario that models a realistic cyber-attack issue faced by many Internet-facing 
enterprises nowadays. The activities and tasks associated with the six phases will cover 
the learning objectives stated in Chapter I. The next chapter will provide more detail on 





V. TRAINING SCENARIO 
This chapter will elaborate on the training methodology applied for the worm-
outbreak scenario. The content will be categorized into six training phases and will 
include the expected results. 
A. SCENARIO BRIEFING 
The purpose of this scenario briefing is to provide SIEM operators with the 
background context for their cyber-forensic analysis. The scenario describes a cyber-
threat (computer worm) faced by a fictional organization that is hosting an online Web 
portal called “SporeFusion.com” and is summarized as follows: 
“SporeFusion.com” belongs to a company that provides personal photo 
service for subscribed customers to customize their digital photos with the 
company’s online photo editing tools. It also allows the customers to print 
their personalized photos on an array of products (e.g., mugs, shirts). The 
company maintains its own IT infrastructure. The infrastructure supports 
two networks: an external network to provide their online services to the 
customers and an internal network to maintain their proprietary company 
information (e.g., sales, orders and inventory).  
Over the years, the organization has been suffering from periodic cyber-
attacks, some of which have resulted in financial loss due to lost customer 
satisfaction or added service costs. The most serious attack rendered the 
online portal unavailable for five days, resulting in great financial loss 
during that period. A preliminary investigation by the company’s own IT 
employees discovered it to be a denial-of-service attack caused by a 
computer worm. Despite this discovery, the company was unable to trace 
the source of the attack or determine the extent of infected hosts within 
their network. 
To improve this situation and improve their overall IT security posture, the 
company has decided to purchase ArcSight ESM as a detective security 
control against these threats. The IT employees within the organization are 
tasked with the mission of utilizing ArcSight ESM to detect and recover 
from threats as quickly as possible.  
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B. PHASE 1 – UNDERSTAND THE BEHAVIOR OF A COMPUTER WORM 
The first phase will require SIEM operators to conduct a study on the behavior of 
a computer worm. Through this study, the SIEM operators will learn and understand the 
worm’s associative traits, which will then become the target of analysis. The following 
highlights some of the fundamental information pertaining to the computer worm that 
must be understood by the SIEM operators during their study: 
 The worm usually originates from a single host. 
 The worm has the ability to self-replicate. This means that once it infects a 
host,  the worm will understand what network it is on and will attempt to 
find nearby host(s) (likely to be  a host with the same vulnerability and lies 
within the same network) and attempt connections to the host(s) through 
various sockets/ports. Thereafter, these newly spread worms will repeat 
the same actions on their newly infected hosts. 
C. PHASE 2 – SET UP REPLAY ENVIRONMENT 
The next phase is to install the replay events and connector for continuous testing 
and analysis on a set of pre-captured events. (Refer to the Appendix for the installation 
guide.) After successful installation, the replay graphical user interface (GUI) can be 
activated through the command prompt in administrator mode. 
 
Figure 20.  Replay connector activation. 
The replay GUI is the main control mechanism that initiates the events 
transmission to ArcSight ESM. Once the replay files have been placed in the correct 
folder as stated in the Appendix, the replay GUI will automatically load all the stored 
events and allow SIEM operators to select the desired set of events to be streamed into 
ArcSight ESM (Figure 21). The GUI also provides a time slider and events transmission 
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rate option (e.g., events/sec or events/min) to manipulate the rate of events being 
transmitted.  
 
Figure 21.  Replay connector GUI. 
The base events stored within the file can be accessed by “right-clicking” on the 
selected file and choosing “Open Selected.” A new screen will appear with all the base 
event entries as shown in Figure 22.  
 
Figure 22.  Access base event entries. 
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For this test scenario, the “WormOutbreak.events” file is selected. As seen in 
Figure 23, each row represents one base event, while each column represents a parameter 
of the ArcSight event schema. The cell holds the value of the parameter associated with 
that particular base event. 
 
Figure 23.  Event Entries in “WormOutbreak.events” file. 
D. PHASE 3 – CONSTRUCT NETWORK TOPOLOGY THROUGH 
“REVERSE-ENGINEERING” METHOD 
ArcSight graphical resources are particularly useful in analyzing the traffic flow 
within a set of replay events. The resources work by leveraging the parameters within the 
event schema (e.g., source and destination IP addresses, device vendor name and zone) to 
map out the networks, associated network devices and the communication flow between 
these devices. With a basic understanding on IP networking (e.g. RFC19186 private 
networks), it is therefore possible for SIEM operators to utilize the graphical resources to 
“reconstruct” the network topology from a set of replay events. 
In normal circumstances, the reconstruction method must be applied to all the 
events in the replay file so as to obtain the full network topology, which may consist of 
                                                 
6. RFC1918 are standards that define the private IP address space. 
1 row =  
1 base event 
1 column = 
1 parameter 
agentSeverity = “Low” 
for this base event
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many sub-networks. For the ease of illustration, the following example will focus on a 
small subset of the events within the replay files. This is done because the particular 
replay file used in our example was collected from a rather large volume of IP space; and 
viewing all of this space using the SIEM’s graphical utilities would result in a very 
“crowded” topological depiction. By limiting the demonstration to a smaller subset of the 
entire IP space (by selecting a subset of the collected events), the resulting graph will be 
easier to see via the below screen captures. 
Prior to viewing the base events in ArcSight Console, the SIEM operators must 
first create an active channel. Periodically, ArcSight ESM will generate internal system 
events that report its current status (e.g. user log-in). To prevent such events from 
clustering with the events of interest, the SIEM operators will use the active channel 
editor to filter out the internal system events. In addition, a customized grid field object 
will be created to limit the number of viewable events’ parameters. In our training 
scenario, both the “Agent Type” and “Severity” parameters will be set to “syslog_pipe” 
and “>= 3,” respectively (with an OR condition), in the active channel editor to display 
the base and correlation events pertaining to the worm outbreak scenario.  
 
Figure 24.  Create Active Channel in Navigator Panel. 
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Figure 25.  Customize Active Channel. 
 
Figure 26.  Customize Grid Fields. 
 
Figure 27.  Create filter in Active Channel Editor. 
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Next, start the replay connector to allow the base events to flow into ArcSight 
Express. 
 
Figure 28.  Start replay connector. 
 
Figure 29.  “WormOutbreak” Base events in ArcSight Console. 
“Continue” changed to 
“Pause” when replay 
connector starts
 46
Once all the base events have been received, ArcSight Console will be able to 
process the encapsulated information and display the inter-connecting network devices 
through its graphical resources. 
 
Figure 30.  Select a subset of events and choose “Event Graph.” 
 
Figure 31.  Choose color code for different nodes. 
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Figure 32.  Overall graph view using organic layout. 
 
Figure 33.  Zoomed in view of Network ‘A.’ 
The graph can be 







Figure 34.  Zoomed in view of Network ‘B’ and ‘C.’ 
 
Figure 35.  IP address of network device. 
Network Device = CISCO Router 
IP add = 65.85.126.1 
This indicates that the 
transmission is permitted
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Figures 32, 33, and 34 show the inter-connecting networks. The white, blue and 
red boxes represent the hosts, while the arrow lines indicate the transmission flow 
direction between the hosts. From the figures, you can see that a series of transmissions 
have been initiated by different hosts in the following order: 
 Public host (IP address = 206.116.23.54) to public hosts in Network ‘A’ 
(65.85.126.x). Transmission is permitted as indicated in Figure 35.  
 Public host in Network ‘A’ (IP address = 65.85.126.60) to private hosts in 
Network ‘B’ (10.0.111.0). 
 Private host in Network ‘B’ (IP address = 10.0.111.39) to private hosts in 
Network ‘C’ (10.0.20.x). 
Network ‘B’ and Network ‘C’ are private networks because they contain IP 
addresses that belong to the private address space as defined in RFC1918. With this 
analysis, the above transmission trend can be interpreted as a typical traffic flow that 
usually happens when an external host attempts to communicate with an internal host that 
is secured within a DMZ. For this case, the situation can be translated to the training 
scenario as such: 
 A “foreign” (not part of SporeFusion) host on the Internet (IP address = 
206.116.23.54) has sent an email containing a computer worm to an email 
relay server (IP address = 65.85.126.60) hosted by “SporeFusion.com.” 
This email relay server lies in SporeFusion’s DMZ zone, Network ‘A’, 
and is responsible for relaying emails from external networks to internal 
networks and vice versa. 
 The computer worm infected the email relay server, causing the mass 
sending of emails to other hosts within SporeFusion’s internal (in relation 
to the DMZ) network, Network ‘B’ (10.0.111.x). 
 One of the hosts (IP address = 10.0.111.39) is infected by the computer 
worm and in turn forwards the mail to the hosts within another internal 
network, Network ‘C.’ 
 From Figure 35, the Cisco router (IP address = 65.85.126.1) is the firewall 
that implements the DMZ and separates the internal and external 
networks. 
Using the above information, the network topology of the subset events can then 
be constructed as shown in Figure 36. .  
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Figure 36.  Simplified Network Topology. 
SIEM operators can now begin to follow through the workflow structure as 
described in Chapter III by starting with key asset identification. Supposedly, the finance 
manager of the “SporeFusion.com” organization is given a personal computer (IP address 
= 10.0.111.39) to carry out his/her work routine. The computer contains a lot of 
confidential information pertaining to the financial health of the organization and is 
therefore identified as a key asset. ArcSight has preemptively modeled the private 
network space (IP address = 10.x.x.x) into the Zone and Network models using the 
globalized Internet standards (e.g., RFC1918), as shown in the following figures: 
 
Figure 37.  Zone Model. 
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Figure 38.  Network Model. 
With the network models already available (as per the original networks from 
which the replay traffic was collected), the SIEM operators will only have to create the 
asset model for the personal computer that belongs to the Finance Manager and link it to 
the zone. ArcSight has provided a “System Asset Category” that helps to define the 
importance of the asset in the perspective of the organization. Since the personal 
computer is a key asset to the organization, it will be tagged with “very high” criticality.  
 
Figure 39.  Create asset model step 1. 
Under “Assets” 
resource
Create an asset for 
Finance 
Manager’s PC 
Enter IP address 
and asset name 
for the PC 




Figure 40.  Create asset model step 2. 
By creating an asset model for the personal computer, ArcSight Express will now 
be able to analyze the asset with greater detail and provide a better threat level evaluation, 
which contributes to event priority determination. Figure 41 illustrates how this added 
asset characterization contributes to the situational awareness of the operator. 
 
Figure 41.  Priority level difference for modeled and non-modeled asset. 
Under “Categories” 
tab for the asset
Click on “Add…” 
button
Select “Very high” 
under System Asset 
Criticality 
Modeled Asset Non-Modeled Asset 
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E. PHASE 4 - ASSOCIATE WORM BEHAVIOR 
With the fundamental information gathered in Phase 1, Phase 4 will focus on 
associating the following: 
 The worm’s behavior with the parameters of the event schema.  
 The communication pattern of a worm outbreak. 
Computer worms usually originate from a single host and attempt to spread to 
other hosts in the same network. Based on this, the “Source IP address,” “Destination IP 
address,” “Port” and “Zone Name” serve as good candidate cueing parameters to track 
the spreading effect. Other than those IP addresses, the ArcSight ESM also introduced 
two more virtual parameters, “Attack IP Address” and “Target IP address,” that can be 
used to identify a worm’s infected source and target destination. The reason for 
introducing the additional parameters can be explained as such: A Network Intrusion 
Detection System (NIDS) has reported attacks from A (e.g., hacker) to B (e.g., server). In 
this normal case, the “Source” and “Attacker” will hold the same value, while the 
“Destination” will correspond to “Target.” However, if information were to flow from the 
server to the hacker (e.g., password file is downloaded by the hacker from the server), the 
base event will report this case as “Source” = “Attacker” = B, and “Destination” = 
“Target” = A. This means that the server has become the “Attacker” while the hacker has 
become the “Target,” which is obviously not true. To rectify such situations, the 
“Originator” parameter within the event schema can be configured accordingly to ensure 
that “Attacker” and “Target” are pointing to the correct hacker and server, respectively. 
As explained, both the “Attacker” and “Target” parameters provide better clarity in threat 
identification. Henceforth, the rules-writing covered in the next phase will cue on these 
two parameters rather than using the “Source” and “Destination” parameters. 
In addition, the worm’s transmission pattern also suggests a “one-to-many” 
communication pattern, which can be translated to the possibility of a network sweep 
occurrence, whereby an infected host will attempt to communicate with multiple, perhaps 
consecutive IP addresses, hosts within the same network. This pattern provides another 
threat behavior that ArcSight can be configured (via a correlation rule) to cue off of. 
With the above assumptions, the association result is summarized in Table 2. 
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originates from a 
single host. 
 
- “Attacker” & “Target” IP 
Addresses, Port and Zone  
- “Attacker” & “Target” Port 
- “Attacker” & “Target” Zone 
- 
2 It has the ability 
to self-replicate.  - 
- Internal network sweep 
- Outbound network sweep 
Table 2.   Worm association table. 
F. PHASE 5 – CONFIGURE RULES 
Prior to writing new rules for the worm outbreak scenario, it is important to know 
that ArcSight ESM provides a Standard Content package that comes pre-installed within 
the ArcSight Console (Figure 42). There are a series of “out-of-the-box” resources (e.g., 
filters, rules and dashboards) that address common security and management tasks and 
that are designed to help new users quickly deploy ArcSight  [10].  
 






In this phase, some of the resources in the Standard Content will be utilized and 
explained. With an understanding on how these resources perform, SIEM operators will 
be able to leverage the given resources to either modify (improve) existing rules or create 
new rules that may be much better tailored to the operator’s own network/system 
environment. The following sections illustrate the steps to create a rule. 
1. Step 1 – Create “Worm Outbreak Test List” Active List 
As mentioned earlier, an active list can be used as a kind of ad hoc “bulletin 
board” to specify fields of event data for correlation or monitoring purposes. For this 
scenario, an active list called “Worm Outbreak Test List” (Figure 43) will be created to 
hold the information of the internal infected hosts once the worm outbreak detection rules 
have been triggered. This active list will be useful for the next phase. 
 
Figure 43.  Create “Worm Outbreak Test List” Active List. 
Create a “New Active 
List” under Lists\Active 
Lists\admin’s Active Lists 
Type in the name of 
the active list 
Select “Fields-
based” type 
These are the parameters belonging 
to the attacker that will be stored in 
the active list for subsequent usage 
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2.  Step 2 – Create “Worm Outbreak Test Rule” 
This is the main rule that will be responsible for correlating the base events and 
detecting the presence of any worm-infected hosts. SIEM operators would create the rule 
using the associated parameters identified previously. For ease of configuration, the 
existing filters “Internal to Internal Events” and “Outbound Events” (Figure 44) from the 
Standard Content will be utilized to identify the associated patterns in this rule. Both 
filters are meant to track events that flow from a private network (e.g., 10.0.x.x) to 
another private network or external (and non-private) network. 
 
Figure 44.  Filters from Standard content. 
The detection rule will be created to look for a single host trying to communicate 
with at least 10 other hosts on the same target port within a given network within one 










COMPARISON & ACTIONS 
Conditions 
(Figure 45. ) 
Every base event shall be checked and ensured that: 
 the associated parameters contain a certain 
value(s) for comparison, and… 
 the correlated event does not already exist in the 
active list, and… 
 the traffic mimics a network sweep pattern (e.g., 
Internal to Internal or outbound network sweep). 
Aggregation 
(Figure 46. ) 
Correlate 10 base events if its: 
 “Attacker” IP address and zone and “Target” port 
remains the same, or… 
 “Target” IP address and zone is unique.  
Actions 
(Figure 47. ) 
If the conditions are met, and the aggregation minimum is 
reached, the applicable base events will be considered 
“correlated” to worm attack behavior, and these actions will be 
taken: 
 Add the “Attacker” IP address and zone and 
“Target” port to the active list (if not already in 
the list). 
 Set the “Priority” to 10. 
 Set the “Category” parameters to be worm-
related. 
Table 3.   Logical Configuration for “Worm Outbreak Detection Test Rule.” 
 58
 
Figure 45.  Worm outbreak detection conditions. 
 
Figure 46.  Worm outbreak detection aggregation. 
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Figure 47.  Worm outbreak detection actions. 
3. Step 3 – Test rule in “Rules Channel” 
After the rule has been created, the SIEM operator can test the rule using the 
“Rules Channel.” This channel allows the rules to be imposed on a fixed time window 
with historical events and prevents any conflicts made to the real-time rules deployed for 
the “Live Channel.” A SIEM operator will usually undergo a few iterations of trial-and-
error in steps 2 and 3 prior to obtaining the desired result. The following shows the 
expected (desired) result: 
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Figure 48.  Verify newly created rule. 
 
 







Apply rule to 
“Worm Outbreak 
Channel” 
A new “Rule 




4. Step 4 – Apply rule to “Live Channel” 
Once the rule has been verified to be working, the next step will be to apply the 
rule to the “Live Channel” as follows (Figures 50 and 51).  
 
Figure 50.  Deploy Real-time rule. 
 
Figure 51.  “Worm Outbreak Test Rule” in “Real-time Rules” folder. 
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With the rule deployed to the “Real-time Rules” folder, all the replay events from 
the replay connector will now be examined to detect the presence of internal worm-
infected hosts. The expected results are as such: 
 
Figure 52.  Infected hosts detected in “Worm Outbreak Channel.” 
“Worm Outbreak 
Test Rule” triggered 
These correlation events are the result 
of other real-time rules from the 
Standard content 
“Worm Outbreak Test Rule” 
has been triggered by other 
hosts. This means they have 




Figure 53.  Infected hosts information in “Worm Outbreak Test List.” 
G. PHASE 6 – LIST INFECTED HOSTS 
This phase will focus on using the graphical resources, in particular the 
dashboard, to list the infected hosts once they have been detected by the rule. The 
dashboard will consist of several data monitors that are supplemented by a filter. The 
filter is responsible for eliciting and displaying the events of interest. An incident report 
will be created to provide summaries of the data pertaining to the infected hosts. The 
steps are as follows: 
1. Create “Worm Outbreak Filter List.” 
2. Create “Worm Infected Test Monitor.” 
3. Create “Worm Propagation by Host Test Monitor.” 
4. Create “Worm Propagation by Zone Test Monitor.” 
5. Create “Worm Outbreak Test Dashboard.” 
6. Create “Worm Outbreak Test Report.” 
1. Step 1 – Create “Worm Outbreak Filter List” 
The reason for creating the “Worm Outbreak Test List” in the previous phase was 
to provide the information of the worm-infected hosts as a rule input to yet another rule. 
This other rule will be used by the data monitors to create a list of all infected hosts. 
Entries created in “Worm Outbreak 
Test List” as a result of the “Worm 
Outbreak Test Rule” being triggered 
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Figure 54.  “Worm Outbreak Test Filter” configuration 
2. Step 2 – Create “Worm Infected Test Monitor” 
This data monitor displays the number of hosts that have been infected in the 
course of a worm outbreak. 
 
Figure 55.  “Worm Infected Test Monitor” configuration. 
Select “Data Monitor 
Type” = “Last State” 
Create “Worm Infected 
Test Monitor” Under 
“Monitor” resource 
Select “Worm Outbreak 
Test Filter” 




Figure 56.  “Worm Infected Test Monitor” expected display. 
 
3. Step 3 - Create “Worm Propagation by Host Test Monitor” 
This data monitor shows the spread of worm activity throughout the network. 
 
Figure 57.  “Worm Propagation by Host Test Monitor” configuration. 
Select “Data Monitor 
Type” = “Event Graph” 
Create “Worm 
Propagation by Host 
Test Monitor” Under 
“Monitor” resource 
Select “Worm Outbreak 
Test Filter” 




Figure 58.  “Worm Propagation by Host Test Monitor” expected display. 
4. Step 4 – Create “Worm Propagation by Zone Test Monitor” 
This data monitor shows the spread of worms across network zones. 
 
Figure 59.  “Worm Propagation by Zone Test Monitor” configuration. 
Select “Data Monitor 
Type” = “Event Graph” 
Create “Worm 
Propagation by Zone 
Test Monitor” Under 
“Monitor” resource 
Select “Worm Outbreak 
Test Filter” 




Figure 60.  “Worm Propagation by Zone Test Monitor” expected display. 
5. Step 5 – Create “Worm Outbreak Test Dashboard” 




Figure 61.  Attach data monitors to dashboard. 
 






6. Step 6 – Create “Worm Outbreak Test Report” 
Similar to the data monitors, a pdf report will be generated based on the 
information captured in the “Worm Outbreak Test List.” The report will consist of a table 
that provides the information of the infected host and a chart that shows the number of 
times the infected hosts have been detected (i.e., matched against the Worm Outbreak 
Test Rule). 
 
Figure 63.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” attributes configuration. 
 
Figure 64.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” template configuration. 
Create “Worm 
Outbreak Test Report” 
Under “Reports” 
resource 
Enter the name of the 
report under 
“Attributes” tab 
Select 1 Chart and 1 
Table report template  
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Figure 65.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” table data configuration. 
 
Figure 66.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” chart data configuration. 
Select “Table” tab 
under “Data” tab  
Select “Worm Outbreak 
Test List” of active list 
resource  
Select which 
parameters to be printed 
by ticking the 
respective boxes 
Select “Chart” tab 
under “Data” tab  
Select “Attacker Address” parameter as Y-axis, while  
“Count” parameter as X-axis  
Preview the 
report  
Select “Worm Outbreak 
Test List” of active list 
resource as data points 
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Figure 67.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” expected display page 1. 
 
Figure 68.  “Worm Outbreak Test Report” expected display page 2. 
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H. SUMMARY 
This chapter has elaborated on the training methodology and provided details on 
how to utilize the comprehensive resources within ArcSight to detect the occurrence of a 
worm outbreak threat situation. The structural approach has been categorized into 
procedural phases and is summarized as such: 
 Scenario briefing – Provide the background context of the training 
scenario. 
 Phase 1 – Conduct a study on the computer worm and understand its 
behavior. 
 Phase 2 – Set up the replay connector with the worm outbreak replay file. 
 Phase 3 – Construct a network topology using the parameters from the 
events provided by the worm outbreak replay file. 
 Phase 4 – Associate worm behavior to the parameters of the events. 
 Phase 5 – Configure rules and filters to detect and elicit information about 
the infected hosts. 
 Phase 6 – Present the information of the infected hosts using monitors and 
dashboard and create a summarized report of the incident. 
In addition to the explanation, the expected results (e.g., screenshots) are also 
included to enhance the understanding. The next, and final, chapter will conclude this 





1. Importance of Source Events 
SIEM products are passive systems that do not possess the capability of detecting 
or analyzing malicious payload. The products rely on information culled from the various 
log reports collected from the various reporting devices. The reported information may be 
highly specific if, for example, the reporting device is a security system (e.g., a host-
based IPS) that “intelligently” analyzes traffic and/or end-device events. The reported 
information may, on the other hand, provide only a “hint” about a threat (e.g., a failed 
connection attempt) and require clever correlative rules writing on the SIEM itself in 
order to deduce an actual threat. Threats (e.g., virus) that only harm the infected host 
(e.g., deletion of system files) and do not display any distinctive network traits may be 
able to sneak past the watchful SIEM products if no device reporting to the SIEM 
provides any tell-tale log information related to that threat. As such, it is important for 
SIEM operators to understand this causal relationship and emphasize the proper 
configurations at the source devices. 
2. “Reverse-Engineering” Inadequacy  
As demonstrated in Chapter IV, a simplified network topology can be constructed 
using the steps mentioned. However, it is crucial to know that the “reverse-engineering” 
method is non-intuitive and will require certain assumptions to justify the sequence of 




S/N INADEQUACY EXAMPLE 
1 Events captured in the replay 
file may not reveal the entire 
configuration of the reporting 
device. 
A router with 4 used interfaces will typically have 
4 IP addresses. However, if the replay file only 
contains transmission records involving 2 of these 
interfaces, the IP addresses of the other 2 would 
never be reported. 
2 The actual number of network 
devices and hosts identified 
may differ from the actual 
topology. 
When a base event shows that a transmission 
occurs between two hosts, it does not necessarily 
mean that the destination host is physically 
available. The base event can only ascertain the 
existence of a source host that attempts to 
communicate with the destination host. 
3 The replay file may not 
contain events that report 
existing devices in the actual 
topology. 
A host connected to the reporting device may not 
have any transmission with other devices. As a 
result, the replay file will not contain any events 
that will provide information on the presence of 
the host. 
Table 4.   Reconstruction method inadequacies  
Despite this, the “reverse-engineering” method is still important in the absence of 
the actual network topology for the context of this thesis. 
B. ADDITIONAL AREAS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
1. Create more Scenarios with Different Threats 
This thesis has illustrated only the structural approach in tackling one cyber-
threat. There are many other cyber threats that could be “captured” as replay files, some 
of which could be quite complex, and thus requiring more effort in tailoring the specific 
rules and filters to attain some desired level of student learning. By working on other 
training scenarios, SIEM operators would be able to gain further insights on the 
commonalities amongst various threats and better understand the utilization of the 




2. Explore Other ArcSight Resources 
In addition to the resources mentioned, ArcSight also provides other resources 
that are useful in profiling the entities within the network. For example, the “Actor” 
resource can be used to model the user and administer his/her associated security 
classification; which is useful for detecting insider threats. The “Use Case” resource 
provides a way to view, configure, and transport specially developed sets of related 
resources that address specific security issues and business requirements. When used 
effectively, this resource can be translated into different scenarios for multi-level training 
purposes. 
C. CONCLUSION 
Computer threats have constantly evolved over the years and security 
practitioners are finding it harder to keep in pace with this worrying trend. As explained 
in Chapter II, issues exacerbating the situation can be attributed to the lengthy time 
required in training qualified and competent SIEM operators, as well as the complexity of 
the tools that can be used to detect the presence of such threats.  
In the face of such problems, this thesis has focused on developing a cyber-
forensics training methodology that aims to educate SIEM operators on the effective 
approach to monitoring and reacting to cyber threats. It incorporates a repeatable SIEM 
educational framework and highlights the structural approach in utilizing ArcSight ESM 
to collect, analyze and detect malicious events. The framework has been empirically 
demonstrated with a worm outbreak lab scenario, where the captured results illustrate the 
feasibility of the proposed approach. Through the methodology presented, it is hoped that 
the rate of training competent SIEM operators might be increased so as to keep up with 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 77
APPENDIX.  REPLAY CONNECTOR INSTALLATION GUIDE 
This installation guide illustrates some of the parameters to be configured and 
provides screenshots to aid the installation process. Two files are required in this setup: 
“WormOutbreak.events” and “ArcSight_Connector_Installer.exe.” 
First, install “ArcSight_Connector_Installer.exe” on a host. For ease of 
management, you can install the connector on the same host that contains the ArcSight 
Console. The following figures show screenshots of the installation process. 
 
Figure 69.  ArcSight Connector Installer screenshot. 
 
Figure 70.  “Choose Install Folder” screenshot. 
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Figure 71.  “Choose Install Set” screenshot. 
 
Figure 72.  “Choose Shortcut Folder” screenshot. 
 
Figure 73.  “Pre-Installation Summary” screenshot. 
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After the installer has copied all the working files to the selected folders, a 
separate “Connector Setup” screen will appear. Select “Add a Connector” and continue to 
the next screen. 
 
Figure 74.  “Add a Connector” screenshot. 
In this screen, you must select the “Test Alert” option from the list of ArcSight 
SmartConnectors“Connector details”  (Figure 75. ). 
 
Figure 75.  “Connector options” screenshot. 
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Figure 76 shows the parameters that control the events flow to the ArcSight 
Express. Their definition can be seen by mousing over their text label (Figure 76). Some 
of the more important parameters to take note are as follows: 
 maxrate & eventrateunit – These two parameters control the maximum 
rate at which events will be sent to ArcSight ESM. For initial learning 
purpose, the rate shall be slow so that it allows ample time for analysis. 
 setdetecttimeasnow & setagenttimeasnow – These two parameters shall be 
set to “true” so that the timestamp of the base events can be synchronized 
with ArcSight Console.  
 randomizeratetime – This parameter introduces randomness to the base 
events received. It shall be set to “0” to prevent the confusion during the 
analysis of the base events. 
 Uienabled – This parameter must be set to “true” for the replay GUI to 
appear. 
 
Figure 76.  “Connector details” screenshot. 
Since the base events must be sent to ArcSight Manager for analysis, the 
“ArcSight Manager (encrypted)” option shall be selected as the destination. 
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Figure 77.  “Select destination” screenshot. 
Depending on how the ArcSight Console has been configured, the “Manager 
Hostname,” “User” and “Password” fields will be filled with the respective values that 
are used to log into the ArcSight Console. The rest of the parameters shall be set to false. 
 
Figure 78.  “Destination parameters” screenshot. 




Figure 79.  “Connector details” screenshot. 
If the values in Figure 78 have been entered correctly, the connector setup will 
attempt to import the certificate from the ArcSight Manager.  
 
Figure 80.  “Import Certificate” screenshot. 
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Figure 81.  “Add connector Summary” screenshot. 
 
Figure 82.  “Install as a service” screenshot. 
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Figure 83.  “Service parameters” screenshot. 
 
Figure 84.  “Exit” screenshot. 
 
Figure 85.  “Install complete” screenshot. 
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Once the replay connector has been installed successfully, create a 
‘ReplayEvents” folder within the ArcSight SmartConnector folder, and copy the 
“WormOutbreak.events” file into it.  
 
Figure 86.  “ReplayEvents” folder screenshot. 
The parameters of the replay connector (Figure 76) can be modified subsequently 
by typing “runagentsetup” in the command prompt as shown in the following: 
 
Figure 87.  Modify replay connector’s configuration. 
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